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In Re Marriage of Brown: Every Family Lawyer Knows What
It's Done-Do You Know What It Can Do?
INTRODUCTION
In re Marriage of Brown' marks a departure from long settled
case law regarding the division of "expectant"2 pension benefits
upon dissolution of a marriage 3 and perhaps heralds a new and
controversial advance in the treatment of nonvested pension
plans. Paradoxically neither the decision nor its treatment of the
valuation of nonvested pension benefits was unexpected.4 In
applying fundamental community property rationale5 to the
1. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
2. Id. at 844,544 P.2d at 564, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 636. Brown dispenses with the
term "expectancy" and instead uses the term "nonvested."
3. Brown specifically overrules French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d
235 (1941).
4. See In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184
(1974); In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405
(1974).
5. That expenditures of community assets, i.e., time, labor, and skills, result
in acquisitions of community property to the extent and in the proportion to the
community expenditures.
field of pension benefits and overruling 35 years of precedent 6 in
the process, Brown created a new community property asset.7 In
reaching its holding8 the Court resorted to a rationale9 the logical
extension of which may lead to a startling proposition: that at the
outset of employment, the nonemployee spouse may have an
enforceable interest in the employment contract of the employee
spouse.10
FACTS
Upon separation of the spouses, the employee spouse was two
years short of acquiring a "vested" interest in the pension plan
notwithstanding the expenditure of 24 years of labor during
marriage. In accordance with traditional case law and section
5118 of the California Civil Code," the trial court held that these
pension benefits constituted mere expectancies and therefore
were not entitled to recognition as a divisible community asset
upon dissolution of the marriage. 12
HISTORY
In the past, treatment of retirement plans 13 was less than
uniform. 4 Behind the rather confused treatment of these plans
lay ostensibly different policies: (1) the protection of the nonem-
ployee spouse's right to share in community acquisitions, and (2)
the recognition of an employer's need to promote and maintain
6. French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941). The case was viewed
as holding that nonvested pension rights are mere expectancies and therefore not
subject to division in a dissolution proceeding.
7. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 844, 544 P.2d 561, 564, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 636 (1976).
8. "Pension rights, whether or not vested, represent a property inter-
est; to the extent that such rights derive from employment during
coverture, they comprise a community asset subject to division in a
dissolution proceeding." In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838,842,544
P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976).
9. The Brown Court essentially treats a contract right as being synono-
mous with a property right.
10. Just what "interest" may be enforced is a question that Brown leaves
unresolved.
11. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1976). "The earnings and accumulations of a
spouse . . . while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the
separate property of the spouse."
12. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 843, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 635 (1976).
13. For the purposes of this Note, retirement plans and pension plans are
synonomous.
14. See Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248 (ct. cl. 1948); French v.
French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39,
94 P.2d 609 (1939); Cheney v. City & Cty. of S.F., 7 Cal. 2d 565, 61 P.2d 754 (1936);
Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936);
Lynch v. United States 292 U.S. 571 (1933).
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stability in his employment relationships. 15 Although acknowl-
edging that community expenditures would ordinarily result in
community acquisitions, case law held to the contrary, stating
that public policy, i.e. maintaining stable employee relationships,
would be hampered if pension rights were to vest in someone
other than the employee. 16
To reconcile community property concepts with public
policies regarding employes pensions, earlier decisions drew
elaborate distinctions between types of plans, categorizing them,
for example, according to whether they were contributory or
noncontributory in nature. This distinction affected particularly
the time and the extent to which the employee's rights would vest.
In plans of the contributory type the employee generally had a
nonforfeitable interest to the extent of his contributions, irre-
spective of the length of his service or the reason his employment
terminated.1 7 Earlier case law, however, gave considerably less
protection to pension plans involving contributions made by the
employer. 8 Since the employee spouse never had control over
retained payments, deductions or employer contributions, the
employee was said not to have a vested property right in the
contributions. 9
In the important 1941 case of French v. French20 the nonem-
ployee spouse argued that "retirement" pay was community
property because it was compensation for services rendered
during the marriage. The California Supreme Court agreed but
15. See Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248 (ct. cl. 1948); French v.
French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235(1941); Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39,
94 P.2d 609 (1939); Cheney v. City & Cty. of S.F., 7 Cal. 2d 565, 61 P.2d 754 (1936);
Dryden v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 6 Cal. 2d 575, 59 P.2d 104 (1936);
Lynch v. United States 292 U.S. 571 (1933).
16. Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 355,361-62,384 P.2d 689,692, 33
Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1963). Today, however, public policy compels a contrary
result. Invariably the fund is the community's only substantial asset, and it is
therefore more equitable to divide it equally rather than leaving the nonemployee
spouse destitute.
17. Kent, Pension Funds and Problems Under California Community Prop-
erty Laws, 2 STAN. L. REV. 447, 448 (1950).
18. Id. at 448. Broader provisions for vesting were customarily available in
plans of the contributory type than in those where the employer bore the entire
cost.
19. Hoeft v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 113 Cal. 91, 96,45 P. 185, 190
(1896). The Hoeft Court found that the employee spouse had a mere expectancy at
most.
20. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
noted that "At the present time his right to retirement pay is an
expectancy which is not subject to division as community prop-
erty."'2' Subsequent cases,22 however, tended to rely upon the
French dictum and erroneously construed the case as holding
that such an expectancy, existing at the time of dissolution, is
never subject to division.23 These cases emphasized the date on
which the employee spouse became eligible to receive his or her
pension notwithstanding the expenditure of community time,
labor and skill prior to such date.24 As a consequence, nonvested
pension rights could not be classified as either community or
separate property because, at best, they were mere expectancies;
the rights to such benefits were unrecognized, unprotected and
inconsequential interests.25 French and the cases following
21. Id. at 778, 112 P.2d at 236. The Court's discussion of retirement pay was
actually dicta; the holding was limited to retainer pay. See Note: Community
Property: Division of Expectancies as Community Property at Time of Divorce,
30 CALIF. L. REV. 469 (1942). The French Court relied on a federal statute which
drew distinctions between retainer and retirement pay. Because a statutory
amendment, 10 U.S.C. Armed Forces (1970), eliminated the distinction, French
should have been overruled prior to Brown. See In re Marriage of Mercier, 48 Cal.
App. 3d 775, 121 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1975).
22. Note: Community Property: Division of Expectancies as Community
Property at Time of Divorce, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 469 (1942); Phillipson v. Board of
Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 41 n.8, 473 P.2d 765, 770 n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 n.8
(1970); Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 11, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167
(1962). Williamson v. Williamson extended the scope of French. In Williamson the
employee spouse was ineligible to retire and the retirement plan made no provi-
sion for withdrawal of accumulated contributions. Following French, the Court
held that a mere expectancy does not constitute property to which a community
interest attaches:
... pensions become community property, subject to division in a
divorce, when and to the extent that the party is certain to receive some
payment or recovery of funds. To the extent that payment is, at the time
of divorce, subject to conditions which may or may not occur, the
pension is an expectancy, not subject to division as community
property.
With an increasingly rigid application of community property principles, Wil-
liamson emphasized the absence of conditions precedent to the receipt of the
money. See also Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 469-70, 492 P.2d 13, 18-19, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 324, 329-30 (1972); Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32,38,473
P.2d 765, 768, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 (1970). If an employee remains employed:
... the nature and value of his retirement pension is contingent both
upon his survival until retirement .... Thus, the retirement benefits of
a present employee are classed as an expectancy, and neither those
rights nor their actuarial equivalent is divided or awarded as communi-
ty property .... Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32,41
n.8, 473 P.2d 765, 768 n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64 n.8 (1970).
23. Note: Community Property: Division of Expectancies as Community
Property at Time of Divorce, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 469 (1942). Phillipson v. Board of
Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). Williamson v.
Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962).
24. It is only on the date of retirement that a property interest in retirement
benefits arises under French.
25. Hoeft v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 113 Cal. 91, 96,45 P. 185, 190
(1896).
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French thus ignored the clear community character of the con-
tributions and focused exclusively on the time set for receipt of
benefits.
This mechanical approach lead to harsh results in many cases.
Adherence to the expectancy view rendered fundamental com-
munity property laws essentially inapplicable to pension and
retirement plans; unfulfilled contingencies or the speculative
value of an inchoate interest often resulted in a forfeiture of the
community's interest in the benefits if the marriage dissolved
prior to maturation of the plan.
Judicial dissatisfaction with this approach became apparent
26
as the courts increasingly expanded the nonemployee spouse's
rights in the pension. The interchangeable use of "vested" and
"matured" to refer to the right to receive pension payments, for
example, disappeared in In re Marriage of Fithian:
The right to retirement benefits 'vests' when an employee acquires an
irrevocable interest in a fund created by his own contributions and/or
the contributions of his employer. The 'vesting' of the retirement ben-
efits must be distinguished from the 'maturing' of those benefits, which
occurs only after the conditions precedent to the payment of benefits
have taken place or are within the control of the employee.
2 7
26. See In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr.
405 (1974); In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642,115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974).
The view that pension rights of the presently employed are an expectancy has
been implicitly rejected by subsequent cases. Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 355
n.4, 530 P.2d 589,593 n.4, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621,625 n.4 (1975); In re Marriage of Bruegl,
47 Cal. App. 3d 201, 205 n.4, 120 Cal. Rptr. 597, 599 n.4 (1975): The ". . . fact that
retirement and the receipt of pension benefits were in the future was not a
contingency affecting the vesting of the right."
27. 10 Cal.3d 592, 596 n.2, 517 P.2d 449, 451 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 n.2
(1974). The cases spoke predominantly in terms of "vestedness," but normally
attached different meanings to the term. See Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal.
App. 2d 8, 21 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962). See Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3
Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970). Pre-1974 case law made no
distinction between "vested" and "matured," ordinarily employing each inter-
changeably to denote the fulfillment of all conditions precedent to payment of the
benefits.
Where the marriage was dissolved before the conditions precedent were met,
courts denied the community any interest in retirement benefits although they
were purchased with community assets. It was therefore easy to emphasize
contingencies, thereby rendering community property principles inoperable.
Cases referred to such conditions as: death, Dryden v. Board of Administration, 6
Cal. 2d 575, 581, 59 P.2d 104, 107 (1936); survivorship, Phillipson v. Board of
Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 41 n.8, 473 P.2d 765, 770 n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61, 66 n.8
(1970); the necessity of applying for benefits, Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60
Cal.2d 355, 361-62, 384 P.2d 689, 652, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1963); termination of
The definitions thus given to "matured" and "vested" necessarily
provided increased protection to community interests by recog-
nizing that property interests arise earlier than at the moment of
pension payments.28
Judicial dissatisfaction peaked in In re Marriage of Wilson. 9
There, the appellate court ordered a division of an "expectant"
pension benefit in a dissolution proceeding. The California Su-
preme Court observed that this may have been a correct reading
of the law, but it reversed the decision on procedural grounds3 0
Although a subsequent appellate decision criticized French and
suggested that a reconsideration of that case was in order, the
court, nonetheless, failed to advance it.3
The Brown court squarely met the French decision 32 stating
flatly that ". . . the French court's characterization of nonvested
pension rights as expectancies errs. ' 33 In explaining its rationale,
the court stated that the right to a pension benefit is a contractual
employment, Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal.3d 32, 41 n.8,473 P.2d
765, n.8, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 n.8 (1970).
28. In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,596 n.2,517 P.2d 449,451 n.2, 111
Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 n.2 (1974).
29. 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1974).
30. Id. at 853. The wife in Wilson acquiesced in the French rationale at the
trial level and failed to cross-appeal from that portion of the judgment. There-
fore, the issue was not properly before the court.
31. In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642,651-52, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184,
190-91 (1974).
32. The French Court incorrectly focused upon the date when benefits
became payable. Brown represents a recognition that the proper inquiry in
pension fund classification is whether the nonemployee spouse has an apportion-
able right of ownership in a retirement fund to the extent it is a product of
community expenditures notwithstanding its contingent, inchoate or forfeitable
nature. The date benefits become payable or vest is no longer controlling, but
merely refers to the time of enjoyment.
It is sufficient, therefore, if pension rights have accrued during marriage. The
presence of conditions regulating the payment of a matured right is irrelevant to
the community nature of the pension because the right to the pension flows from
the services rendered by the employee during marriage:
Whether a pension plan provides for fixed or variable payments, and
whether adjustments occur automatically or require legislation, the
basic point remains that the pension serves as remuneration for services
rendered by the employee; if these services were discharged during the
marriage, that remuneration must compose a community asset. Waite v.
Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 471, 492 P.2d 13, 20, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325, 332 (1972).
"It is established law that pension rights of a spouse resulting from his employ-
ment during marriage are community property," In re Marriage of Ward, 50 Cal.
App. 3d 150, 153, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1975); Benson v. City of Los Angeles, 60
Cal. 2d 355, 359, 384 P.2d 649, 651, 33 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259 (1963), "It necessarily
follows that pension rights which are earned during the course of a marriage are
the community property of the employee and his wife .. " In re Marriage of
Ward, 50 Cal. App. 3d 150, 153, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234, 236 (1975).
33. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 844, 544 P.2d 561, 564, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 636 (1976).
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one derived from the terms of the employment. It explained that
a contractual right is not an expectancy but is rather a chose in
action, a property right.34 Therefore, the ". . .employee acquires
a property right to pension benefits when he enters upon the
performance of his employment contract. '35 (Emphasis added.)
Without evidencing any consideration of the question, the Brown
court assigned the contract right to the employee spouse.
THE CONTRACTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT
Brown's impact on community property law is already appar-
ent. The Court has introduced its own ill-defined contract princi-
ple into the field of community property law. Brown asserts that
* . a nonvested pension right is nonetheless a contractual right,
and thus a property right."3 6 To whom this contract right belong
remains unsettled. Paradoxically Brown uses contract rights
"belonging" to the employee spouse to create a community prop-
erty asset for the nonemployee spouse.37 Inasmuch as a contract
right constitutes a property right, 8 it is arguable that the
nonemployee spouse acquires an enforceable community inter-
est therein at the outset of employment.39
34. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 846, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
37. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 656, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. Given the broad proposi-
tion that nonvested pension rights are property rights based on a contractual
right, and in view of the judicial progression expanding the nonemployee
spouse's rights from matured, to vested, to nonvested rights, is it within this
progression to recognize the nonemployee spouse's rights upon execution of the
contract of employment with respect to all matters relating to the disposition of
the pension plan? The courts formerly held to one extreme, i.e., that only when
pension benefits were payable did a community property right arise in the
nonemployee spouse. The courts have since expanded the community property
rights of the nonemployee spouse as described above. Since Brown recognizes a
community property right in nonvested pension plans, there is but one logical
step remaining: recognition of a community property right in the contract of
employment itself.
38. Id. Although a contract right is always a property right, In re Marriage of
Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,564,126 Cal. Rptr. 633,636 (1976), the converse
is not true; a property right is not always a contract right. Nevertheless, the Court
in Brown appears to treat a contract right as being synonomous with a property
right in the employee spouse. According to fundamental community property
law, if the property right exists in the employee spouse, and it is obtained during
marriage, the nonemployee spouse is said to have a community interest therein,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1976).
39. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5110 (West 1976).
Once it is acknowledged that pension rights are treated as
compensation for services rendered, it is difficult to justify sum-
marily depriving ths nonemployee spouse of his or her communi-
ty interest in the contract right at any time during the marriage. If
Brown and its progeny fail to recognize the continuing communi-
ty property right of the nonemployee spouse in the contract of
employment, then the unilateral termination of employment by
the employee spouse prior to dissolution would divest the
nonemployee spouse of that interest. Unless the courts recognize
and enforce this continuing interest of the nonemployee spouse,
these acquisitions during marriage would not constitute com-
munity property in apparent contradiction of section 5110 of the
California Civil Code. As a consequence, Brown would paradox-
ically preserve the fundamental error of French while purport-
ing to overrule it. If the employee spouse leaves employment
prior to dissolution, the courts following the Brown rationale
should recognize the clear community character of the prior
contractual right and prevent a forfeiture of the "consideration
for services rendered in the past" which is otherwise worked
upon the nonemployee spouse. Brown cannot be said to stand for
such a proposition.
Suppose, for example, that the employee spouse has worked
for 15 years but resigns before his pension rights have vested and
at a time when dissolution is not contemplated. The employee
spouse's unilateral decision would deprive the nonemployee
spouse of his or her "community" interest in 15 years of accumu-
lated consideration in the nonvested pension plan. Equal man-
agement and control was never exercised over the asset, con-
trary to the requirement of California Civil Code section 5125, 11
and it is arguable that the nonemployee spouse has been de-
prived of "property" without due process of law.
This possibility raises the spectre of the employee spouse hav-
ing to obtain the consent of the nonemployee spouse before
terminating any employment or at least of having to compensate
the nonemployee spouse for the appropriate value of the com-
munity interest in the non-vested plan that would be forfeited.
The latter view would not substantially impair either the em-
ployee spouse's right to terminate his employment or his right to
choose his place of work. Rather, once the employee spouse
commenced work (receiving part of the consideration through a
40. Id.
41. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West 1976): "... either spouse has the manage-
ment and control of the community personal property ... as the spouse has of the
separate estate of the spouse."
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pension plan) the employee spouse could not unilaterally dispose
of the "accumulated community asset," i.e. the nonvested pen-
sion plan. The fact that there would be an equal forfeiture as
between the spouses is of little consolation; the nonemployee
spouse has unilaterally been deprived of a significant property
interest.
CONCLUSION
At a minimum, a new and substantial community property
asset has been judicially created. At present, its creation will
benefit the wife more often than not. Though the advantage may
be lost as more women enter the labor market, the Court's
holding in Brown seems consistent with the legislative and judi-
cial policy of equalizing the treatment between the sexes.42
In essence, Brown recognizes the injustice of rendering com-
munity property principles inapplicable to pension benefits on
the basis of inartfully drawn historical distinctions and therefore
holds that community property principles were never correctly
applied to pension plans in California. By viewing retirement
benefits in this manner the court has, perhaps unwittingly, ad-
vanced the proposition that the nonemployee spouse has an
enforceable interest in the pension plan from the outset of em-
ployment. But the fact that retirement pay may be increased,
diminished or forfeited does not change the original community
nature of retirement benefits which are determined at the outset
of employment. Because the court based its holding on the
rationale that the right to pension benefits is a contract right and
therefore a property right, it may well be that the nonemployee
spouse's rights in a nonvested pension are more extensive than
the Court imagined. 43
GORDON HARTSTEIN
42. See California Family Law Act of 1970.
43. In a brief comment, the Court in Brown notes that it does not "conceive"
that its decision will in any way impair the employee spouse's traditional right to
choose or terminate his place of employment, In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d
838, 849, 544 P.2d 561, 568, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 640 (1976). This Note posits a
"conceivable" situation and suggests the essence of Brown is contrary to a
passing remark.

